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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Apparent Authority Of Agent To Transfer 'Stock
Owned 'By Principal
Henry v. Auchincloss, Parker and Redpath'
Plaintiff, an elderly lady over 100 years old, was the
owner of certain securities. It was her custom to rely upon
her son to handle her monetary affairs.' They jointly
signed a lease for a safe deposit box and the securities
were kept therein. In 1955 the son arranged for the open-
ing of an account in plaintiff's name with the defendant
stock brokerage house. The application for the opening
of the account was signed by the plaintiff personally. Sub-
sequently, the plaintiff and her son opened a joint check-
ing account. In 1958 the son removed the stock certificates
from the safe deposit box, forged plaintiff's signature to
provide an indorsement, and delivered the certificates to
the defendant stock brokers with instructions to sell them.
The proceeds of such sales were turned over to the son
in the form of checks made out to the order of plaintiff.
These checks were deposited in the heretofore mentioned
joint bank account and the son and a grandson, who had
a power of attorney to sign checks on the account, drew
checks against this account for their own purposes. Plain-
tiff sued the stock brokerage house for conversion, alleg-
ing that the stock certificates were wrongfully delivered
to the defendants by her son and that defendants wrong-
fully sold those securities. The defendant's motion for a
directed verdict was granted by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia on the basis that:
"[B]y leasing a safe deposit box jointly with the son,
by permitting her securities to be kept in this safe
deposit box, and by opening an account with the defen-
dants as well as a joint checking account with her
son .. , the plaintiff, unwittingly perhaps, conferred
upon the son apparent or ostensible authority to handle
the securities for her. The fact that some of the in-
dorsements on the certificates were clever forgeries
does not change the situation."3
An agent may receive express authorization to sign his
principal's name. Actual authority to indorse commercial
1193 F. Supp. 413 (D.C.D.C. 1961).
'Id. The court did not indicate that this included signing plaintiffs
name on stock certificates or any like matter.
3 Supra, n. 1, 415.
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paper may also be established by implication, when im-
plied "from the very nature of the agency created," or
as "an actual incident to an established course of dealing."4
It has been said in many cases that authority to indorse
commercial paper will be implied only where it is mani-
festly necessary to enable the agent to perform his duties.5
An agent's mere possession of commercial paper does not
in itself suggest authority to indorse.6 Forgery requires
an unauthorized making or alteration and thus can never
be within the actual authority of an agent.'
In the present case, the United States District Court in
reaching its decision, maintained that plaintiff was bound
by the transfer. The Court reached this result in spite of
the rule that, when an agent's forgery is required to effect
a transfer of the principal's stock certificates to a third
person (even a holder in due course), the principal is not
bound when nothing more suggestive of negligence is
shown than that the agent was permitted access to the
stock.' First, the Court relied upon and quoted the
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, where it is stated that:
"[A]pparent authority to do an act is created as to
a third person by written or spoken words or any
other conduct of the principal which, reasonably inter-
preted, causes the third person to believe that the
principal consents to have the act done on his behalf
by the person purporting to act for him."9
Bronson's Executor v. Chappell'° was cited as having pre-
viously approved and applied this doctrine." While this
case clearly did apply the doctrine of apparent authority,
'Bortner v. Leib, 146 Md. 530, 538, 126 A. 890 (1924).
612 A.L.R. 111, 119 (1921); see also 37 A.L.R. 2d 453, 479 (1954);
2 C.J.S. 1300, Agency, § 112.6 Jackson Paper Mfg. Co. v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 199 Ill. 151, 59 L.R.A.
6 57, 93 Am. St. Rep. 113, 65 N.E. 136 (1902) ; Security National Bank of
Duncan v. Johnson, 195 Oki. 107, 155 P. 2d 249 (1944); 12 A.L.R. 111,
120 (1921). Cf. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (2d ed. 1958) § 69, comment c: "an
agent authorized to take charge of . . . securities has -thereby no authority
to . . . transfer the subject matter."
'"[W]hen a forgery is committed there can be no pretense of au-
thority .. " Morse v. United States, 265 F. 2d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 1959).
82 Am. Jur. 274. Agency. § 352.
ORESTATEMENT, AGENCY (2d ed. 1958) § 27, p. 103.
10 12 Wall. 681 (U.S. 1870).
"Id., 683:
"[I]f he has justified the belief of a third party that the person
assuming to be his agent was authorized to do what was done, it is
no answer for him to say that no authority had been given, or that
it did not reach so far, and that the third party had acted upon a
mistaken conclusion. He is estopped to take refuge in such a defense.
If the loss is to be borne, the author of the error must bear it."
19621
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it concerned a sale of land where the agent acted beyond
his scope of authority in taking purchase money, and was
not concerned with the present problem of the effect of for-
gery on apparent authority in the sale of stock securities.
Thus the cases are distinguishable on the facts involved.
The RESTATEMENT also states:
"For apparent authority there is the basic require-
ment that the principal be responsible for the informa-
tion which comes to the mind of the third person....
Thus, either the principal must intend to cause the
third person to believe that the agent is authorized to
act for him, or he should realize that his conduct is
likely to create such belief.' '12
Sometimes apparent authority is derived not from express
manifestations of the principal to the third person, but
from the agent's status; the agent has those powers which
are normally expected to be exercised by an agent in a
similar position unless the third person is otherwise in-
formed. Briefly, to create apparent authority the principal
must directly or indirectly make the representations to
the third party from which the third party infers authority
in the agent. Thus the doctrine is based upon appearances
which are created by the principal, and an appearance of
authority created by the agent's acts and representations
alone, does not suffice to created apparent authority. 3 It
should be remembered in the present case that there is
no indication that the plaintiff, the principal, had never
made any manifestation that her son could sign her name
on any stock certificates, or that her son was authorized
to sell any of the certificates listed in her name. The case
cites no authority to suggest that a third person could
reasonably suppose, from the agent's position or known
actual authority, that he was authorized to indorse the
certificates.
. But there is authority for finding that a principal is not
bound under the circumstances here. In Pennsylvania Co.
for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Franklin
Fire Insurance Co.,4 a father, as trustee, kept shares of
stock in a vault to which he gave his son access. The son,
who apparently conducted most of his father's business
affairs including the trust, stole the stock certificates,
forged a power of attorney, and secured a transfer of the
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (2d ed. 1958) § 27. p. 104.1 13 MICHEA. OUTLINES oF AGENCY (4th ed. 1952) § 94, p. 61.
14181 Pa. St. 40, 37 A. 191 (1897).
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shares on the corporate books. The court refused to im-
pose liability upon the father, saying the loss was occa-
sioned not by the act of the father in giving the son access
to the vault and stock, but because the defendant, without
inquiry, accepted the forged signatures as genuine. The
court also said:
"[B]ut even if the father had authorized the son, in
some instances, to write his name to a power authoriz-
ing a sale or transfer of some other security, having
no connection with these ... shares of stock, that fact
would not warrant the inference that such authority
had been given in this case."5
In the similar case of Townsend v. Union Trust Co. of
Donora,6 a stockholder was induced by a stock salesman
to turn over her stock to him. The stockholder did not
assign the certificates, sign a power of attorney, authorize
indorsement or in any way seek to divest herself of title
or ownership. The salesman pledged the stock with a trust
company to obtain a personal loan by using a forged power
of attorney. The trust company made no inquiry as to the
genuineness of the stockholder's signature. The stockholder
was held not to be estopped from asserting title as against
the pledgee who took under the forged powers of attorney.
The court said that the general rule (i.e., where one of two
innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who
has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must
sustain it) "cannot prevail in a case of forgery.'17
The second authority relied upon by the District Court
in reaching its decision was National Safe Deposit, Saving
& Trust Co. v. Hibbs,' "a case that is practically on all
fours [with the principal case] both as to the facts and
the law."' 9 In that case, the plaintiff bank had made a loan
to a customer who gave as collateral security, certain stock
certificates. A trusted employee of the bank took the cer-
tificates and delivered them to the defendant stockbrokers
with instructions to sell them, which the defendants did,
and delivered the proceeds to the dishonest employee. Suit
was brought by the plaintiff bank against the defendant
-Id., 194.16 2 F. Supp. 734 (W.D. Pa. 1933).
17Id., 736; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Feilback Co., 39 F.
Supp. 740, 742 (N.D. Ohio 1941). RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (2d ed. 1958)
§§ 176, 177, and 202 also suggest that the agent in the subject case had no
power to defeat his principal's title.
."229 U.S. 391 (1913).
19 Supra, n. 1, 415.
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brokers to recover the value of the stolen stock certifi-
cates. The court refused to allow the bank to recover.
However, this case may be distinguished from the prin-
cipal case for an important reason. The stock certificates
involved were indorsed by the owner in blank. In the
principal case there was no such indorsement; indeed the
signature of the plaintiff was forged. It is a well recog-
nized rule that a stockholder who delivers stock to another
party, indorsed or assigned in blank, gives the party to
whom the certificates are delivered, such indicia of owner-
ship that an innocent purchaser for value, can retain the
certificates and the true owner is estopped from asserting
title.2" However, such a claim of estoppel "has rarely pre-
vailed where the indorsement or transfer was forged. '" 21
Thus, the rule applied in the Hibbs case is applicable only
in situations where the certificates were indorsed in blank,
and would not be controlling here.
The decision in the principal case is difficult to reconcile
with the provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,2
since the stock involved herein was not transferred as re-
quired by that statute. There was neither a certificate
indorsed in blank, a delivery by the person appearing by
the certificates to be the owner of the shares represented
thereby, nor a separate document containing a written
assignment or power of attorney.
A case very similar to the principal case is Telegraph
Co. v. Davenport.2 3 This was a suit to compel the defen-
12 Am. Jur. 97, Agency, § 116; 13 Am. Jur. 423, Corporations, § 350;
73 A.L.R. 1405, 1407 (1931).
21 13 Am. Jur. 423, 424, Corporations, § .350.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE (1951) Title 28, § 2901:
"§ 28 - 2901. How title to certificates and shares may be transferred.
Title to a certificate and to shares represented thereby can be trans-
ferred only -
(a) by delivery of the certificate endorsed either in blank or to a
specified person by the person appearing by the certificate to
be the owner of the shares represented thereby, or
(b) by delivery of the certificate and a separate document con-
taining a written assignment of the certificate or a power of
attorney to sell, assign, or transfer the same or the shares
represented ithereby, signed by the person appearing by the
certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby.
Such assignmnt or power of attorney may be either in blank
or to a specific person.
The provisions of this section shall be applicable although the
charter or articles of incorporation or code of regulations or by-laws
of the corporation issuing 'the certificate and the certificate itself
provide that the shares represented thereby shall be transferable only
on the books of the corporation or shall be registered by a registrar or
transferred by a transfer agent. (Dec. 23, 1944, 58 Stat. 927, ch. 729,
§ 1.)" Emphasis supplied.
297 U.S. 369 (1878).
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dant company to replace, in the names of the plaintiffs,
certain shares of stock transferred without their authority.
A widow was left certain shares of capital stock of the
Western Union Telegraph Company, for herself and as
guardian for two children. The certificates were placed
in a tin box which was deposited in a bank for safekeep-
ing, where the widow's brother, an officer of the bank, had
access to it. On two different occasions when the widow
was absent from the city, she gave the key to the box to
her brother so that he could obtain collection coupons for
bonds in the box when they became due. On each occa-
sion the brother took certificates from the box and forged
the childrens' names to the transfer and power of attorney.
The brother sold the certificates and the purchasers, using
the forged power of attorney, obtained a transfer of the
shares on the books of the defendant company. The
Supreme Court of the United States held, "upon the facts
stated here there ought to be no question as to the right
of the plaintiffs [the widow and the two children] to have
their shares replaced on the books of the corporation. .,.4
The court also stated:
"Neither the absence of blame on the part of the
officers of the company in allowing an unauthorized
transfer of stock, nor the good faith of the purchaser
of stolen property, will avail as an answer to the
demand of the true owner. The great principle that
no one can be deprived of his property without his
assent, except by the processes of the law, requires
in the cases mentioned, that the property wrongfully
transferred or stolen should be restored to its rightful
owner. The maintenance of that principle is essential
to the peace and safety of society, and the insecurity
which would follow any departure from it would cause
greater injury than any which can fall, in cases of un-
lawful appropriation of property, upon those who have
been misled and defrauded. '25
The recent case of Hurley v. Southern California Edison
Co.,2" followed the Telegraph Company case and quoted
at length from the latter case including part of the quota-
tion above. In Prince v. Childs Co.," a case in which the
- Id., 371.
Supra, n. 23, 372.
183 F. 2d 12.5 (9th Cir. 1950).
Id., 130-131.823 F. 2d 605 (2d1 Cir. 1928).
1962]
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court said "there seems to be no substantial difference
between the present case and Telegraph Co. v. Daven-
port,"29 the plaintiff stockholder gave her secretary access
to a safe-deposit box containing stock certificates, ordered
purchases of stock through the secretary, and allowed the
secretary to deposit dividend checks in the plaintiff's ac-
count. The secretary subsequently took some of the cer-
tificates, forged the plaintiff's signature, and sold the cer-
tificates without authority. In compelling the defendant cor-
poration to issue new stock to the plaintiff, the court said,
"Here was no apparent authority, but a bare forgery."30
In Maryland it has been clearly established that an
agent's authority to indorse negotiable instruments will
be implied only where such power is necessary to per-
formance of duties which are customarily incident to the
agency established,3 or where such is shown to be an
actual incident to an established course of dealing.2 In
the case of Trust Co. v. Subscribers Etc.,33 the Maryland
Court of Appeals indicated that a principal was under no
duty to keep watch of his agent's transactions to protect
third persons from an unauthorized indorsement of a nego-
tiable instrument from subsequent misappropriations. In
addition Maryland has also adopted the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act,34 including the sections referred to previ-
ously. 5 In Hambleton v. Cent. Ohio R.R. Co.,36 the court
said that "[ilt being conceded that the stock belonging to
[the principal], had been transferred without his knowl-
edge and consent, by means of the forgery of his name upon
the powers of attorney, it is clear that his title was not
divested thereby."37 If the principles in these Maryland
cases were applied to the facts of the principal case, it
would be difficult to affirm the decision reached by the
United States District Court.
WILBUR E. SIMMONS, JR.
2Id.. 608.
1 Supra, n. 28, 608.
" Trust Co. v. Subscribers, Etc., 150 Md. 470, 133 A. 319 (1926) ; also see
12 A.L.R. 111, 119 (1921).
2Bortner v. Leib, 146 Md. 530, 126 A. 890 (1924).
"Supra, n. 31.
12 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, §§ 100-122.
Supra, n. 22.
44 Md. 551 (1876). See also Brown v. Howard Fire Ins. Co., 42 Md. 384,
20 Am. Rep. 90 (1875).
=Hambleton v. Cent. Ohio R.R. Co., id., 558.
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